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Stephen F. Williams*

The Requirement of Beneficial Use
as a Cause of Waste in Water
Resource Development
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of prior appropriation is a rule of capture. Under the
doctrine, one may acquire a property right in water only by applying it
to a "beneficial use," and in no state does reservation of water for future
use qualify as a beneficial use. Moreover, with a few special exceptions
(for instream uses such as recreation),' one must also divert the water.
As a result, anyone anticipating a surge of future demand and higher
prices for water rights can exploit that insight only by investing in diversion works. Such projects are likely to be premature or economically
unjustifiable regardless of their timing. To the extent that premature or
otherwise uneconomic investment occurs, the beneficial use requirement-ironically---causes waste. 2 If this requirement of prior appropriation law is applied to nonrenewable groundwater, an additional wastepremature consumption of the water itself-may result.
Similar waste would result from unmitigated application of the rule of
capture to oil and gas reserves-the other great resources to which it
nominally applies. All the major oil and gas states, however, have adopted
conservation legislation aimed at curing the problem. It is thus curious
that neither legislative action nor even scholarly discussion has focused
on this defect of prior appropriation law. 3
Section II of this paper explains the ways in which prior appropriation
law brings about waste in water resource development. Section III then
examines the logical cure: authorization of anticipatory water rights which
would vest without application to a beneficial use. Finally, Section IV
relates that cure to some special institutional features of water resource
allocation: the role of governmental agencies as water rights owners and
inter-regional conflict over water.
*Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder.
1. See Tarlock, Appropriationfor Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New"
Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211.
2. 1 use the term waste in an economic sense: "Waste is a preventable loss the value of which
exceeds the cost of avoidance." See S. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 129 (1971).
3. The great exception is C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER
RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES 39-43 (National Water
Commission Legal Study No. 4, 1971).
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II. WASTE INHERENT IN PRIOR APPROPRIATION LAW
Projects that are economically unjustifiable regardless of their timing
can arise in the following way. Suppose that an observer of the water
and energy scene believes that by the year 2010 the price of conventonal
oil will be such as to make oil shale production feasible on a large scale.
To some extent he might exploit that insight, and the resultant return from
holding water rights for later resale, simply by acquiring existing water
rights and leasing them in the meantime to their current users or to others.
But that strategy involves paying for the water right itself, while making
a new appropriation enables him to avoid that cost.
A new appropriation would, however, require investment in diversion
works to transport the water to a place where it could be put to current
use under circumstances that local law would not view as wasteful and
which would yield some revenue in the meantime. A hypothetical project
for those purposes might have the following characteristics. Project cost,
discounted to present value at 5%,4 is $5 million (this and all figures are
in constant 1982 dollars). The present value of the returns from use of
the water at the end of these diversion works, over the maximum useful
life of the works, is $4.5 million. The present value of that portion of
the returns to be received between scheduled completion of the project
in 1985 and the year 2010 is $3.2 million. Finally, suppose the investor
were confident that he would be able to sell the water rights in the year
2010 for about $7.5 million. At the 5% discount rate being employed,
the $7.5 million has a present worth of about $2 million. The expectation
of that sale would make the project appear to be a profitable one, even
though the purpose for which the water would be sold in the year 2010
would make no use whatever of the diversion works into which our
investor proposes to sink resources (see Table 1).
A pivotal component of the returns that our investor anticipates is the
$2 million present value of the proceeds from sale of the water rights in
the year 2010. The component is phantom. If it were not for the fact that
the law prohibits acquisition of a property right in water without diversion
for a beneficial use, there would be no causal link between the $2 million
return and the investment.
If ownership of water rights were possible without application to a
beneficial use, investors would pay up to $2 million to acquire such
rights. The payment of $2 million by the highest bidder would involve
no waste, as it would entail no actual expenditure of real resources. Were
4. The hypothesized interest rate is a real one, i.e., net of anticipated general price inflation. The
choice of interest rate is arbitrary but does not affect the principle illustrated.
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TABLE 1
(All figures are in terms of present values.)
Returns
From sale of water delivered through
these diversion works, 1985-2010
From sale of water rights in 2010
Total returns
Cost
Net apparent gain
Less phantom gain: the revenues from
sale of water rights in 2010
Net waste

$3,200,000
2,000,000
$5,200,000
- 5,000,000
$

200,000

- $2,000,000
- $1,800,000

the state to auction off the rights under the circumstances assumed, it
would receive the $2 million.
We can reframe the analysis in terms of external costs. The investor's
diversion of the water denies some other party the opportunity to sell the
water in the year 2010. On the facts presented, that opportunity has a
present value of $2 million-a cost that is external to the investor's
considerations. Under conventional prior appropriation concepts, the party
denied that opportunity is presumably the state. Prevailing western water
practice conceals the loss of the opportunity, however, for the state rarely
sells rights in unappropriated water; it gives them to the first capturer.
This analysis applies despite the fact that many of the actors on the
water development scene are public entities that do not pursue pecuniary
profit. Even a pubic entity may rush forward with diversion and transportation facilities in order to assure supplies for the future since, under
current law, that is the only way to obtain a secure property right in such
supplies. However, since the public entity normally does not anticipate
future sale of the resulting water right for some completely different use,
the diversion and transportation facilities are more likely to be consistent
with the long-range use of the water. In such a case, the rule against
anticipatory rights causes waste by requiring the pubic entity to expend
resources on diversion and transportation sooner than is necessary (see
Table 2).
Here the beneficial use rule has accelerated production by 15 years.
The gross cost is $5,000,000 less $2,405,000, or $2,595,000. The cost
is a real one. Society must forego the product that that capital could have
5. This figure represents the $5 million cost, discounted by another 15 years because construction
is deferred for 15 years.
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TABLE 2
(All figures are discounted to present value.)
Construction to be
completed in 1985
Returns
From use of water, 1985-2000
From use of water, 2000 on
Total returns
Costs

Construction to be
completed in 2000*

$2,200,000
$3,000,000

$3,000,000
$5,200,000
- $5,000,000

Net gain
$ 200,000
Increase in costs from accelerating construction ($5,000,000
minus $2,405,000)
Increase in benefits from accelerating construction ($5,200,000
minus $3,000,000)
Net loss from accelerating construction

$3,000,000
- $2,405,0001
$ 595,000
$2,595,000
-

2,200,000
$ 395,000

*The developing agency can both defer construction for 15 years and acquire a presently secure
right in the water only if the law accepts the concept of anticipatory rights.

furnished in the 15 years from 1985 to 2000 if it had not been misapplied
to construction of water diversion facilities. 6 The cost is offset, to be
sure, by gains from use of the water in the 1985-2000 period, but as
those gains equal only $2,200,000, the net social loss is $395,000
($2,595,000 minus $2,200,000).
Where nonrenewable groundwater is involved, additional losses are
likely in the form of premature depletion of the reservoir. Under a rule
of capture, any potential extractor tends to disregard a key cost of present
extraction: the value lost as a result of foreclosing later extraction. Like
two boys attacking a single milk shake with two straws, well drillers are
likely to extract the water at a faster than optimal rate. One who anticipates
rising real prices for water, and concludes that its present net value would
be greater if extraction started five or 20 years in the future, cannot defer
drilling on the basis of these calculations. What he does not extract today,
he may never be able to extract. Moreover, to the extent that there is no
regulatory agency able to keep the number of wells at the optimal level,
the race to extract may well lead to an excessive number of wells. These
problems are, of course, very closely analogous to those generated by
application of the rule of capture to oil and gas. In the oil and gas context,
6. If the real price of construction (i.e., its price relative to other prices) is rising, that would
offset the usual gains that accrue from deferral of expenditures. Of course, if expected future real
prices of construction are much higher than current real prices, investors generally will accelerate
construction, thereby increasing the current real price and reducing the gap between the current price
and the expected future price. Thus the offset seems unlikely to be large for any extended period.
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however, state legislatures have sought to cure such problems with wellspacing and allowable regulations 7 and with provisions that facilitate
unitization. I
So far as renewable water supplies are concerned, the essence of the
cure would be to allow people to acquire a right to water without putting
it to any beneficial use. Alternatively, one might simply recognize holding
for future use as a form of beneficial use, thereby preserving more of the
existing nomenclature. A new form of water right would thus come into
existence-an "anticipatory water right." 9
III. ANTICIPATORY WATER RIGHTS AS A CURE:
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The proposal of aniicipatory rights raises a series of practical problems
and possible objections. Some problems relate to (a) the initial allocation
of such anticipatory rights, others to (b) the effects of such a change after
initial allocation.
A. Initial allocation
If anticipatory rights were allocated without charge, as current-use
rights are, obviously the amount sought would vastly exceed the available
supply. Moreover, those to whom such rights were allocated would enjoy
a windfall. The solution suggested by Meyers and Posner, which appears
clearly sound, is an auction of some sort, perhaps modelled on government
auctions for oil and gas leases.'" Presumably bidders would be willing
to offer roughly their estimate of the present discounted value of the
proceeds of sale of the water for the uses which they anticipated.
7. Well-spacing regulations restrict the number of wells that can be drilled into a reservoir,
providing, e.g., that no more than one well may be drilled for each 80 acre tract. Allowable regulations
restrict the rate of flow per well or per tract.
8. Unitization entails a cooperative plan of exploitation, under which each owner's return is
independent of the number of wells on his tract or their rate of flow. The owner's return depends
instead upon his proportional contribution of mineral-bearing land to the unitized area and on the
extent to which he has contributed capital to the extraction process.
9. Such a right would also constitute part of any rational market-oriented program for extraction
of nonrenewable groundwater. The other parts of such a program are beyond the scope of this paper.
Besides removing the incentive for the sort of wasteful expenditures described above, recognition
of such a right would create improved incentives for current owners of appropriative rights to adopt
water-saving technology and practices. The primary incentive for a right holder to invest money in
water-saving is the prospect of either applying the saved water to some purpose of his own or selling
the resulting extra water. But under present law, even assuming a jurisdiction that has removed the
more arbitrary obstacles to sale of salvaged water rights, one who frees up water by water-saving
techniques cannot hold his legal right to the saved water unless he more or less immediately sells
it to someone then ready to embark upon applying it to a beneficial use of the traditional sort. At
any specific time, there may be few potential buyers ready to embark on such immediate use.
Recognition of anticipatory rights would increase the number of potential current buyers, and thereby
create a better market for sale of the water rights freed by water-saving.
10. See MEYERS & POSNER, supra note 3. at 42-43.
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The auction solution would give some concrete meaning to the vague
proposition, so much a part of current water law, that the unappropriated
waters of the state belong to "the public."" An auction would enable
the public to realize on that purported ownership-now a matter of rhetoric-in the form of receipts flowing into the state treasury.
Not only does an auction solve the twin goals of (a) avoiding windfalls
and (b) equating supply with demand, such a method also averts problems
that arise when government allocates rights on the basis of vague notions
of merit or public interest. The Federal Communication Commission's
allocation of valuable radio and TV channels exemplifies such a method.
The result is that applicants invest enormous resources in hiring highpriced lawyers to put on a largely meaningless show-meaningless because the criteria for the public interest are necessarily so elusive. Interminable and unmanageable procedures, inconsistent results, and corruption
are also likely.' 2
Identifying the "public interest" in connection with anticipatory water
rights would be no easier. An auction decentralizes and objectifies the
process of identifying anticipated projects with the greatest value. Bidders
who win through excessive optimism will bear the loss. As a consequence,
individuals unskilled at estimating future values will tend to be driven
from the field and individuals with the necessary skills will tend to prevail.
The uses that will generate the highest returns for the owners of the
water rights are not ipso facto the uses with the highest value when all
other interests are also taken into account. Uses will vary in the extent
to which they generate external costs or benefits, i.e., costs or benefits
external to the calculation of the owner. But the problem of varying
externalities is completely independent of the ownership of anticipatory
rights. If it is appropriate for government to constrain actual water uses
in the light of those externalities-whether by prohibiting or taxing disfavored uses, by subsidizing favored ones, or by administrative review
of such effects as part of the process of change in water use-government
may do so whether or not people are able to hold anticipatory rights. 3
B. Effects of ownership of anticipatoryrights
The primary objection to ownership of anticipatory rights is likely to
be expressed as a fear of "speculation" and "hoarding." "The big oil
companies will grab up all the rights." "Money means nothing to those
companies." The fear deserves a very close look.
The first answer to such opposition is that prohibition of anticipatory
rights does not prevent speculation. Rules proscribing reservations for
11. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
12. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 78-89 (1982).
13. For a discussion of the impact that administrative review procedures can have on the process
of converting anticipatory rights to active use rights, see Section III.B. 1.(c), infra.
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future use merely force the would-be speculator to disguise his activity
by wasting resources in the construction of diversion works that are either
economically unjustifiable regardless of their timing (as in Table 1), or
are premature (as in Table 2).
Second, in the case of nonrenewable water resources, behavior that is
often labelled speculative has the effect of reserving the resource for use
at future times when, according to the speculator's calculation, its value
will be higher. It is the prospect of enjoying a greater return (even after
all costs and returns have been discounted to present value) that induces
a resource owner to hold it for sale at a later period. Future consumers
compete with present ones simply because resource owners anticipate
their demand and respond to the prospect of enhanced returns by deferring
extraction. Unless we wish to deprive future consumers of the use of
exhaustible resources, we should not condemn the process that makes
such use possible. 5
While fear of speculation and hoarding constitutes a primary objection
to ownership of anticipatory rights, a related fear is that such rights will
cause waste. This objection assumes that water will not be put to use
between the time of acquisition of the right and ultimate application of
the water to the longterm use for which it was acquired. But anticipatory
water rights need not prevent other uses in the interim. Suppose X is
holding anticipatory water rights based on his expectation of an application to oil shale in the year 2010. Y comes along with a project that
could use the water from 1982 through 2009, and the benefits from use
in that period exceed the costs of the project. Clearly this creates an
opportunity for a mutually favorable transaction between X and Y. And,
assuming that there are many Xs and Ys (that is, many people holding
anticipatory water rights and many people interested in renting them for
the intermediate or short-term), there would be a competitive market for
such rentals. But the owner or lessee of the rights, in considering investment in diversion works, would measure the costs against returns
over the leasehold period; the skewed calculation represented by Table 1
would not occur. 6
14. See MEYERS & POSNER, supra note 3, at 41.
15. For a consideration of this reservation process and some of its frailties, see Williams, Running
Out: The Problem of Exhaustible Resources, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1978); SCARCITY AND
GROWTH RECONSIDERED (V. K. Smith ed. 1979).
16. In reality, of course, the investor must deal in probabilities of future value. Changes may
occur after completion of the diversion works that would make it profitable to use those works
indefinitely. But in deciding to proceed, the investor will discount such changes in accordance with
their probability. Thus he will proceed only when the present value of the costs of the facilities are
less than the expected present value of the returns. The expected value of returns sums up the returns
under each plausible scenario, discounted in each case for probability. Thus if there are only two
scenarios, A and B, and if scenario A has a probability of l-in-3 and returns of $1 million, while
scenario B has a probability of 2-in-3 and returns of $3 million, the expected value of the returns
is (/3 x $1 million) plus (7/3 x $3 million), or $2,333,333.
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Of course lessees of such rights would have to pay the owners rent,
an expense that would be unnecessary if the water had remained unowned.
But in a competitive market the rent would be no more than what was
economically sound-the value of the most valuable alternative use precluded by the lessee's use of the water. No lessee should get the water
unless his use is sufficiently productive to enable him to pay such a rental.
Even in markets with only one owner of anticipatory rights, that owner
would still want to maximize his returns by making rentals. Such a
monopoly position might cause fewer anticipatory rights to be leased than
in a competitive market. The solution to such a problem would be a
prohibition on any one entity's holding an excessive fraction of the total
anticipatory rights outstanding."
A parallel fear expressed in the speculation and hoarding epithets is
that owners of anticipatory rights will fail to sell them to water developers
even when the time is ripe. But a properly functioning market provides
incentives to discourage speculators from holding on to their properties
for longer than is in the public interest. For example, what prevents an
owner of undeveloped land from refusing to allow its development after
the time for such action is ripe? If people with ideas for alternative uses
can readily make bids for undeveloped land, the owner who persists in
holding his land undeveloped incurs opportunity costs. He must forego
not only the money offered by bidders but also the income that he could
earn by investing that money. A speculator in coffee (or any other commodity in which definite property rights exist) incurs similar opportunity
costs: if he fails to sell a bag of coffee today, he must forego the income
that he could enjoy from the proceeds of the rejected opportunity to sell.
The holder of a bag of coffee is constantly trading off the present value
of a future sale against the present value of a current one. If the price
bid by current consumers were to exceed the present value of the proceeds
of a future sale, some holders would sell off (thereby bringing the price
relationships back into equilibrium, so that the present value of a future
sale just equals the current price).
To describe the incentive mechanisms which encourage speculators to
sell at the right time is not, of course, to say that the right number of
speculators will necessarily do so at the right time. But the market provides
great rewards for those who decide correctly. Denial of those rewards to
speculators who decide incorrectly constitutes a substantial penalty for
them. Natural selection is likely to eliminate (or at least confine to a small
portion of the market) all would-be speculators except those who are, on
the average, good at choosing their timing.
In a properly functioning water market, similar incentives would op17. For a discussion of this solution to monopoly problems, see Section III.B.2, infra.
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erate on the owners of anticipatory water rights. Suppose, for example,
that X has acquired water rights in anticipation of sale for oil shale
purposes in the year 2010, at a price that he calculates will yield returns
with a present value of $2 million. If entrepreneur Y conceives of a
project that will start immediately and that will yield net returns with a
present value higher than those of X's project, he should be able to offer
X a sum large enough to induce him to sell. If the present value of the
net returns from Y's project are, for example, $3 million, both parties
can gain by a sale from X to Y at any price between $2 million and $3
million.
There are, however, two impediments to the sale or conversion of
anticipatory rights. The first is transaction costs and the second is the risk
of monopoly ownership of such rights.
1. Transaction costs
High transaction costs might buffer an owner of anticipatory water
rights from feeling the full brunt of these opportunity costs. For the
opportunity costs to have bite, the owner must be more or less continually
exposed to opportunities to sell, at prices at (or close to) the true market
value of his rights. If high transaction costs cause bids to be rare and to
come in at less than the true market value of his rights, then there will
not be enough bids, or the bids will not be high enough to impose adequate
opportunity costs on the owner.
Relevant transaction costs might apply at two stages: simple sale by
the owner of the anticipatory rights, and conversion of the rights to an
active use. The transaction costs for negotiation and execution of a sale
should be no greater than for an ordinary sale of a parcel of real property.
However, conversion of anticipatory rights to active use is in some respects similar to conventional water rights transfers, such as changes in
manner of use, in place of use or in point of diversion. Such transfers
typically entail high transaction costs.
Yet conversion of anticipatory rights in fact differs sufficiently from
conventional water rights transfers that transaction costs need not prove
excessive. Those costs seem to fall into three classes: (a) ones that simply
would not apply to conversion of anticipatory rights; (b) ones that might
apply, but which any legislature willing to recognize anticipatory rights
would want to correct; and (c) ones which would remain in the absence
of some innovation.
(a) Transaction costs inherently inapplicable to sales of anticipatory
rights. A major source of high transaction costs for conventional water
rights transfers is the need to protect junior appropriators who are dependent upon return flow from the water in the area of its original use.
The relevant transaction costs involve information-gathering and legal
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proceedings. The parties engaged in the transfer, and any juniors challenging it, must obtain evidence as to historical use and as to the portion
of the withdrawn water that returns to the stream. Then, through some
combination of litigation or bargaining, they must work out the terms of
protection for juniors who would be adversely affected by the transfer.' 8
However, no such evidence-gathering or legal proceedings would be
necessary in connection with the transfer of anticipatory rights, for there
would be no juniors with any legal right to "return flow." To the extent
that there were junior appropriative rights in use, they would necessarily
be subordinate to the right of the owner of anticipatory rights to withdraw
the entire amount of his paper right. If the anticipatory owner were only
entitled to withdraw the consumptive portion of his historic use, that
would of course be zero percent, and his right would be utterly worthless.
Accordingly, recognition of an anticipatory right necessarily requires that
the holder be able to change it to an active use without being subject to
the restrictions of "historic use" or of juniors' interests in the non-consumptive portion of the right.
(b) Transaction costs qualifiedly inapplicable and amenable to legislative eradication. Conventional water rights transfers are impeded by
various statutes, administrative rules, and administrative attitudes. In
some states, for example, statutes virtually prohibit such transfers. ' 9 The
prohibitory laws appear designed to prevent owners of paper water rights,
which far exceed the needs of the property to which they were originally
applied, from enjoying a windfall through sale of the excess.20 This
statutory goal of preventing windfalls is inapplicable in the case of anticipatory rights acquired by bidding at auction. 2' If the bidding has been
genuinely competitive, there would be every reason to suppose that the
22
winning bidder has paid the expected present value of the right acquired.
In some states doubt exists as to the power of water districts to sell
18. As a matter of substantive law, the right transferred is typically reduced in order to protect
juniors. That reduction is not here treated as a transaction cost, as it is necessary to compensate
juniors for real losses that the transfer would otherwise impose. One may view the pre-transfer water
right as having two components, one owned in full by the nominal owner and transferrable by him,
the other owned de facto by the juniors. On transfer, the portion owned de facto by the juniors is
split off and (by virtue of cancellation of the nominal owner's right) functions to protect the value
of their rights.
19. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§533.040 (1981), 533.325 (1979); OKLA. STAT. Tit. 82,
§ 105.22 (1981 Supp.); S.D. LAWS ANN. §§46-5-33 to 46-5-35 (1967 & Supp. 1982).
20. See E. MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 174 (1903); MEYERS & POSNER, supra
note 3, at 25-27.
21. I assume arguendo that the windfall prevention goal might under normal circumstances be
sufficient to justify the transfer restriction. In fact there are cogent reasons to repeal such statutes
altogether. See MEYERS & POSNER, supra note 3, at 25-27.
22. See note 16 supra for a discussion of expected values.
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off water rights.23 Inherent in any legislative decision to recognize anticipatory rights would be approval for institutional holders of those rights
to transfer them. Such power to transfer would be essential if anticipatory
rights were to be an effective means of removing incentives to speculative
24
investment in diversion works.
These restrictions on transfers or clouds upon the legality of transfer
generally tend to arise out of attitudes that are inconsistent with recognition of anticipatory rights. While those attitudes might constitute a
formidable obstacle to recognition of such rights, any legislature that was
persuaded of the advantage of recognizing anticipatory rights would almost surely be ready to eradicate these restrictions or clouds.
(c) Transactioncosts applicable to conversion of both anticipatoryand
conventional rights. A serious obstacle to changes in the use of conventional water rights is that, although the parties engaged in the transfer
must protect juniors who would be adversely affected, the transferee
typically obtains no property right in the return flow at the new location.
Thus the parties to the transfer confer an uncompensated benefit on water
users downstream of the point to which the transfer is made. Their inability
to capture the value of that benefit, coupled with their duty to protect
adversely affected juniors, amounts to a de facto tax on transfers.25
The impact of this de facto transfer tax on the conversion of anticipatory
rights to active use rights would be to load the dice as between types of
23. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-122 (1978 Reissue); 51 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 153, No. 68102 (1968) (saying that a water conservation district held its water in trust to receive and distribute
water to landowners within the district, so that it could not sell surface recreational water rights to
a land developer); and see CAL. WATER CODE § 22261 (West, 1956) ("Nothing in this article
[referring to Water Code §§ 22250-64 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982)] authorizes the sale of any water
right" [by an irrigation district]). This incapacity of California water agencies appears to have been
remedied by Assembly Bill 3491 (1981-82 regular session), which amends §§ 1009, 1010, 1011 and
1427 of the Water Code, and adds Chapter 3 (commencing with § 380) to Division 1, and Chapter
6.6 (commencing with § 1435) to Part 2 of Division 2, of the Water Code. CAL. WATER CODE
codified in Ch. 867, Statute of 1982 (1982). See generally MEYERS & POSNER, supra note 3, at
Appendix 1.
24. Happily, recent years have reflected some legislative readiness to enhance transferability of
water rights. In California, for example, it had been the view of the State Water Resources Control
Board that a rights-holder's effort to transfer a water right in any given year demonstrated that he
was not applying his water to a beneficial use and was therefore not entitled to it afterwards. See
S. ANGELIDES & E. BARDACH, WATER BANKING: HOW TO STOP WASTING AGRICULTURAL WATER 10- 11 (Institute for Contemporary Studies 1978). State legislation has now corrected this. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 109, 1011, 1244, 1725-45 (West, 1982 Supp.).
25. See L. M. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY & ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS 8-14 (1970). Where the transfer is to a different
stream, the transferee may be able to retain a property right in the return flow from the new use.
See City & Co. of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972);
Williams, Optimizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 COLO. L. REV. 301, 311-21 (1973).
The exception for imported water is helpful but leaves large quantities of water subject to the general
rule.
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uses to which the water could be devoted. A 10 percent consumptive use
(i.e., 90 percent of the water originally withdrawn returns to the stream)
clearly imposes a far smaller burden on the total water system than one
which is 100 percent consumptive (zero return flow to the stream). Yet
prospective developers of projects with low consumptive use would enjoy
no advantage when bidding for anticipatory rights against prospective
developers with a 100 percent consumptive use. Nor would they enjoy
any possibility of recapturing the value of the 90 percent of the water
which they would return to the stream. The most attractive remedy would
be to give those who apply the water to an active use the right to resell
or reuse such return flow. 26
A further type of transaction cost exists in those legal systems where
change of water use is subject to administrative review, not merely to
protect juniors, but for broader purposes. 27 Imposition of such review
could be expected to have two effects on the operation of anticipatory
rights. First, the review process itself would be a transaction cost. Second,
any bidder for an anticipatory right at the initial auction would want to
discount his bid against the possibility of administrative rejection of some
prospective development, and accordingly the revenues generated by sale
of anticipatory rights would be lower.
A state employing such a system would have to determine whether the
gains-such as, perhaps, the opportunity to prevent distortions arising
from externalities in the application of water to a new use-were sufficient
to justify the costs. More precisely, the state would want to determine
how to maximize the excess of expected gains over the costs. If many
complex issues were cognizable in the review process, and the agency
were afforded wide ad hoc discretion, then the costs to water ownersboth out-of-pocket costs from participating in the process and uncertainty
costs from being unable to plan-would be high. If so, the review process
would be a substantial impediment to conversion of anticipatory rights
into active use rights. A legislative decision to create a high-cost review
process could represent such a preference for administrative discretionary
26. See MEYERS & POSNER, supra note 3, at 29-31.
27. For example, Wyoming permits owners of water rights to transfer them with the permission
of the State Board of Control, which is empowered to inquire into such matters as "the economic
loss to the community and the state if the use from which the right is transferred is discontinued,"
and the "extent to which such economic loss will be offset by the new use." WYO. STAT. § 41-3104 (1977). See also Comment, Changing Manner and Place of Use of Water Rights in Wyoming,
10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 455 (1975). Read broadly, this statute would allow the board to
condition grant of a permit on resolution of a very elaborate cost/benefit calculation, including, for
example, pecuniary spillover effects of the transfer. Alternatively, of course, one might construe the
provision as referring to the economic interests of the exchanging parties, so that their determination
to make the exchange would give rise to a virtually conclusive presumption that the advantages of
the transfer outweighed its drawbacks.
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processes over the market as to be inconsistent with the premises of
anticipatory rights.28 But a process limiting the grounds of review and
the scope of the agency's ad hoc discretion would not impose unduly
high transaction costs on transfer of anticipatory rights.
Moreover, even where the state elected to impose a high-cost review
process, the owner of the anticipatory rights would face similar costs
were he himself to convert those rights to active use. Since the returns
from conversion to active use must be discounted for the risks of the
review process-regardless of whether it is the holder of the anticipatory
rights or a buyer of those rights who wishes to affect the conversionthat process is simply a burden on any conversion. The review process
would not impede the ability of entrepreneurs who conceive of active
uses different from those intended by the original owner to bid the rights
away from him.
Finally, a state would logically want to provide for review of conversion
of an anticipatory right to active use by whatever criteria (if any) it applied
for review of initial applications to a beneficial use under its present
system, rather than the criteria used for transfers. In terms of physical
effects, clearly conversion of an anticipatory right is the equivalent of
the former, not the latter. Under such a view, application of water to
active use would face precisely the same hurdles under the anticipatory
rights concept as under the beneficial use doctrine.
In summary, high transaction costs in the conversion of anticipatory
rights into use rights would carry a risk of unduly delaying water development. Such transaction costs would tend to shelter owners of anticipatory rights from the opportunity costs inherent in holding on to their
rights too long. However, some of the potential sources of high transaction
costs are simply inapplicable to the conversion of an anticipatory right,
while others are such that any legislature ready to recognize anticipatory
rights would surely want to remove them. Suitable legislation also can
cure the problem of distortion between uses of different degrees of consumptiveness, and can assure that administrative review of conversion
of anticipatory rights is no more onerous than review of the comparable
event under. conventional appropriation rules.
28. Whatever the costs of the review process, any state requiring such review would be burdening
the conversion of low-value active use rights to high-value ones as well as the conversion of
anticipatory rights to active use ones. Where the process was very costly, it might well be that the
low-value rights held in place by these burdens were of no more value than the anticipatory rights
whose conversion was similarly obstructed. Of course the value takes a different form: low-value
active use rights presumably accomplish some affirmative physical task, such as watering a field
and making crop growth possible, while anticipatory rights offer a far more subtle contribution, that
of removing incentives to disguise speculation with wasteful water projects.
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2. Monopoly
Monopolistic control of anticipatory rights might also impede sale for
longterm uses. Under some conditions a monopolist might profit by selling
off, in any given time period, less than the quantity of anticipatory rights
that would be sold off in a competitive market.29 But solutions are available. The statute enabling creation of anticipatory rights could provide
that no single entity would hold more than some specific percent of the
anticipatory rights. The prohibition would have to operate so as to avoid
evasion by the use of affiliates. Further, because water transportation
costs are high, markets are to some degree local; thus it might be wise
to place some additional ceiling on the fraction of anticipatory rights held
by any one entity in each watershed.
The problem of monopolistic control seems, therefore, reasonably susceptible of solution. Further complications could ensue, however, if one
tried to use anticipatory rights to solve some of the political problems of
water allocation; these are discussed below.
IV. ANTICIPATORY RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT
OF INTERBASIN TRANSFERS
Up to this point this paper has considered the recognition of anticipatory
rights primarily in terms of avoiding the economic waste that occurs when
speculators in water rights must disguise their speculation by making an
actual diversion. But there is another dimension to the recognition of
anticipatory rights: such recognition may present an opportunity to defuse
some of the intense poltical conflict over interbasin transfers.
Market systems have a tendency to defuse political conflict, largely
because anyone who obtains a resource must pay the prior owner a price
that satisfies that owner.30 Thus the shipment of several hundred billion
dollars worth of oil out of Texas does not much alarm the Texans, since
that oil is owned by people and corporations who sell only at prices they
consider acceptable. (Even in the era of price controls and windfall profit
taxes, the point is largely true.) In contrast, in the currently pending
litigation over transfer of New Mexico water to El Paso, several of the
New Mexico parties have urgently objected that if El Paso is allowed to
make the proposed appropriation, it will have acquired the resource "free." 31
Partly as a consequence of there being no automatic pecuniary compen29. The monopolist typically chooses a level of output lower than would prevail under competitive
conditions. In the case of sale of a resource over time, however, he will tend to move sales away
from the time periods where demand is inelastic and into periods where it is relatively elastic. This
tendency might work to accelerate sales. See Williams, supra note 15, at 177.
30. For a general exposition of the point, see D. Lee, The Political Economy of Social Conflict,
or Malice in Plunderland (International Institute for Economic Research, Orig. Paper 36, 1982).
31. See Post-Trial Brief of Defendant Garza and Defendant-Intervenors, at 5, 15-17, City of El
Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730-HB, (D.N.M. filed April 8, 1982).
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sation when water is appropriated for use in another region, there is heavy
political pressure for statutes arbitrarily protecting basins of origin.32
Provision for the ownership of anticipatory rights would seem capable
of defusing interregional conflict over water, just as private ownership
of unextracted resources plays such a role in oil and gas. To the extent
that owners of anticipatory water rights were local individuals or water
development agencies, the flow of funds to such owners would tend to
temper the political resistance of citizens in the exporting basin. However,
there is no reason to think that such local owners would predominate. In
the case of oil, local people tend to receive a significant share of the
proceeds of sales: the owner of the overlying land will likely be entitled
to royalty on the extraction, and the extraction process itself generates
local employment. But the lion's share of anticipatory rights in Colorado's
Western Slope water, for example, might be held by shrewd investors in
New York, Chicago and Los Angeles.
A partial remedy for the problem of out-of-state owners would be to
allocate the proceeds from the initial auction of anticipatory rights to the
water's area of origin.33 Although there seems no objection to doing so,
such an allocation would probably not fully defuse the political conflict.
While the auction proceeds would presumably approximate the present
value of the water, the discount to present value might make those proceeds look small compared to the region's perception of the future value.
Moreover, the proceeds would not capture significant pecuniary "spillover" benefits, such as increases in land value, employment, and entrepreneurial opportunities, that would accrue to the region if it retained the
water locally and built an economy on its use. The mystique of water is
such that residents of an export region may have a very optimistic view
of those spillover benefits.
A further means to help defuse political conflict-in addition to allocating proceeds of the sale of anticipatory rights to the water's basin of
origin-might to be relax the anti-monopoly rules in favor of ownership
by regional entities of a political or semi-political nature. These entities
would certainly include, for example, irrigation districts, and could in32. This applies both to in-state transfers, see, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505, 11460
(West 1971 & Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STATS. § 37-45-118(l)(b)(IV) (1973) (application only
to transbasin diversions by a water conservancy district; and to out-of-state transfers, see, e.g., N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978); cf. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR
THE FUTURE 327-333, Recommendation 8-3.b (1973); ANGELIDES & BARDACH, supra note
24, at 32.
33. Assuming special statutory provision or reasonably well functioning capital markets, the areaof-origin entity to which the proceeds were allocated could use them to purchase the rights. (Apart
from special statutory provision, it could use borrowed funds to pay for the fights, repaying the
money when the auction proceeds were disbursed to it.) Thus it would obtain the rights without
payment. This possibility relates to the suggestion below that area-of-origin anxiety could be further
reduced by some relaxation of anti-monopoly rules in favor of water districts.
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clude general purpose municipal governmental units such as counties or
cities. As a result, more of the proceeds of ultimate sale of the anticipatory
rights, on conversion to active use, would flow to the area of origin itself.
But such a change in favor of regional ownership introduces problems
of its own. To the extent that local political or semi-political entities own
the rights, there is less likelihood of response to economic incentives than
would be true if the rights were held by private entities. For example, a
political or semi-political owner seems more likely than a private owner
to place an unrealistically high value on the rights that it holds. The fact
that the entity's managers will have a political interest in the growth of
the region seems likely to obstruct recognition of the value of pecuniary
offers by water developers from other areas. Further, although journalists
are diligent in smoking out certain forms of "waste" by public officials,
opportunity costs-the foregoing of returns from a potential sale-seem
generally to elude the press. As a consequence, public entities would be
more likely than private ones to reject bids by developers with projects
that are in fact far more economically valuable than the local uses to
which the entity might ultimately allocate the rights.
One way to offset this effect might be to give the political constituency
of the entity holding the rights some immediate interest in the proceeds
of any sale that the entity might make. For example, if the owning entity
were required to distribute the proceeds of any sale to its constituents,
then the constituents would put pressure on the politicians to approve
realistic bids for uses outside the region. Whatever the solution, the goal
of depoliticizing conflict over water transfers is likely to require some
compromise of the pure efficiency purposes of recognizing anticipatory
rights.
CONCLUSION
Present appropriation law generates wasteful expenditure of resources
because it forces people (individuals, private corporations, and public
corporations) who anticipate rising demand and rising market value for
water rights to invest in wasteful facilities in order to secure rights to
future use of water. Such people must disguise their "speculative" intent
with diversion works that are economically unjustifiable or premature.
Recognition of anticipatory rights in water would remove the incentive
for such wasteful expenditures.
Recognition of anticipatory rights should not foreclose any economically sound water development project. Antimonopoly rules should preserve a competitive market both for lease and for sale of the rights in fee
simple. Because the predominant sources of high transaction costs for
conventional water transfers are either inapplicable to conversions from
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anticipatory status, or could be easily removed by a legislature authorizing
recognition of such rights, holders of anticipatory rights would be kept
under substantial pecuniary incentives to sell those rights for application
to active use at a suitable time.
Finally, recognition of anticipatory rights holds out some prospect of
helping to defuse the political tension commonly involved in inter-regional
water transfers. By helping to provide a mechanism for compensation of
citizens in the basin of origin, anticipatory rights can change the bargaining over such transfers. Instead of poltical wrestling, with the losing
region defeated by the winning region, the bargaining can become a
process of mutually advantageous exchange. But achievement of this
latter goal may partly frustrate the goal of attaining full economic rationality in the allocation and development of water resources.

